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Abstract: This paper offers a synoptic account of the state of the debate within Marxist scholars
regarding the current structural crisis of capitalism, identifies two broad streams within the
literature dealing, in turn, with aggregate demand and profitability problems, and proceeds to
concentrate on an analysis of issues surrounding the profitability problem in two steps. First,
evidence on profitability trends for the Nonfarm Nonfinancial Corporate Business, the
Nonfinancial Corporate Business and the Corporate Business sectors in post-War U.S. are
summarized. A broad range of profit rate measures are covered and data from both the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis (NIPA and Fixed Asset Tables) and the Federal Reserve (Flow of
Funds Account) are used. Second, the underlying drivers of profitability, in terms of technology
and distribution, are investigated. The profitability analysis is used to offer some hypotheses
about the current structural crisis.
JEL Codes: B51, E11.
Keywords: profitability, technological change, income distribution, structural crisis.

1. Introduction
The US and the global economy are in the grip of the most profound crisis since the Great
Depression. The course of capitalist development has been punctuated by such deep structural crisis –
the Long Depression in the 1880‟s, the Great Depression in the 1930‟s, the Stagflation of the seventies
and the current crisis. Marxist analysis sees these recurrent crises as reflections of the inherently
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contradictory and turbulent nature of capitalist accumulation.1 The precise causal mechanisms
underlying the present crisis remain subject to intense debate among Marxist scholars. This is not
surprising. Despite a long engagement with the theory of crisis, Marxist scholarship has not developed
a single, overarching “general theory” of capitalist crisis.
The structural crisis of the seventies had also engendered a rich debate on the root cause of the
crisis. The “Monthly Review School” saw the crisis as a reflection of the tendency towards stagnation
fostered by the dominance of monopoly. In the absence of external factors, the development of
productive capacity outpaced internally generated demand (Baran and Sweezy 1966, Sweezy and
Magdoff 1981). The “Profit Squeeze” explanation ascribed the eruption of crisis to the impact of rising
wages in eroding profitability (Glyn and Sutcliffe 1972; Body and Crotty 1975). Within the Social
Structures of Accumulation Theory, the crisis was seen as an outcome of declining labor productivity
with a fall in the intensity of work (Bowles, Gordon and Weisskopf, 1987). In Brenner‟s account, the
crisis was precipitated by intensification of competition, which squeezed profit margins and led to
persistent overcapacity in manufacturing (Brenner, 2006). In contrast, while Shaikh (1987) explains the
crisis of the seventies as stemming from a falling rate of profit due to a process of increasing capital
intensity and labor saving technical change that is reflected in a rising “materialized composition of
capital”. Moseley (1992, 2000) highlights the growth of the ratio of unproductive to productive labor as
the main reason for declining profitability and stagnation.
While the explanations varied, these rival theories at least agreed on the nature of the empirical
trend of falling profitability that marked the crisis of the seventies. A peculiar feature of the current
debate is the absence of agreement on the basic question of the predominant trend in profitability
leading up to the crisis. Given the centrality of the question of profitability to Marx‟s analysis of
capitalist dynamics, a constructive evolution of the theoretical debate around the causal mechanisms
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engendering the current crisis would require some resolution of the empirical trends. This paper does
not attempt to resolve the larger theoretical debates in the theory of crises; instead it seeks to clarify
some of the empirical issues in the debate on the origins of the current crisis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a brief overview of the main
competing accounts of the current crisis. Section 3 investigates and summarizes profitability trends;
Section 4 presents results on profit rate decomposition in order to investigate the roles of technology
and distribution as drivers of profitability2. This investigation offers some interesting insights into the
different regimes of technological change in Postwar United States. Specifically it points to the
significance of the sharp fall in capital productivity in the period preceding the crisis. Declining capital
productivity is an important driver of declining profitability in Marx‟s analysis. This bias in the pattern
of technical change has been explained as a response to the pressure of rising wages. The recent sharp
decline in capital productivity is remarkable in that it occurs in the context of stagnant wages. The final
section of the paper offers an account of this development in the context of the crisis.
2. Explaining the Current Crisis
The dominance of finance and the phenomena of financialization is no doubt an important
aspect of any account of the current crisis3. What distinguishes Marxist explanations is that while they
recognize the importance of financialization and the role of financial speculation in triggering the
crisis, they seek structural explanations for the rise to dominance of finance and for the real component
of the current crisis.
Marxist accounts of the causal mechanisms of crisis fall very broadly into those focusing on
aggregate demand and those focusing on profitability. The former focuses on the growing gap between
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For accounts of the role of finance in the unfolding of the crisis see Gowan (2009), Blackburn (2009), Lapavitsas (2010),
Crotty and Epstein (2009)

productivity of workers and their earnings. Growing inequality exacerbates the problem of effective
demand, with investment failing to fill the gap. The latter trend, i.e., the one focusing on profitability,
focuses on the specific pattern of technical change induced by capitalist competition. Labor
productivity is increased by increasing mechanization and capital intensity of the production process,
with a consequent tendency, with stable profit shares, for a fall in the profit rate. There is of course a
link between problems of demand and problems of profitability. Stagnation of demand could erode
profitability and rates of return on capital investment, and declining profitability itself could lead to a
fall in investment demand.
In the competing explanations of the current crisis too we find this dual focus on stagnation of
demand and the declining rate of profit.

2.1. The Alternative Explanations
2.1.1. Stagnation under Monopoly-Finance Capital
Bellamy Foster and Magdoff (2009) base their argument on the characterization of
contemporary capitalism as the phase of monopoly-finance capitalism. This argument draws on the
analytical tradition of Kalecki, Steindl, Baran and Sweezy. Monopolization erodes price competition
and dampens the dynamic impetus to new innovations. At the same time growing income and wealth
inequality acts as a limit to consumption demand. The investment-seeking surplus generated by the
enormous and growing productivity of the system is increasingly unable to find sufficient new
profitable investment outlets. Monopoly capitalism faces a tendency toward stagnation as a
consequence of the gap between the growing economic surplus and existing outlets for profitable
investment. There is a continual need to find new ways to profitably invest its surplus and new sources
of demand. But rather than invest in socially useful projects that would benefit the vast majority, capital
has constructed a financialized "casino". Capitalism in its monopoly-finance capital phase becomes

increasingly reliant on the ballooning of the credit-debt system in order to escape the worst aspects of
stagnation. Thus it is this tendency to stagnation that engenders financialization. Finance has served as
a lucrative outlet for economic surplus while also indirectly stimulating demand through asset price
appreciations and bubbles. The housing bubble is then seen as an attempt to counteract this inherent
tendency towards stagnation. With the bursting of the bubble, demand collapsed, leading to a deep
crisis.

2.1.2. Over-competition and Over-accumulation
In contrast to the monopoly-finance phase argument, Brenner‟s (2010) argument stresses
globalization and the intensification of competition since the seventies as new manufacturing powers
entered the world market – Germany and Japan, the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs), the South
East Asian ``Tigers'' and, most recently China. This has led to a persistent tendency to overcapacity in
global manufacturing and a consequent decline of the rate of return on capital investment since the
seventies. The stagnation of real wages in this period is insufficient to counteract the dampening impact
of chronic overcapacity on profitability. In response capital has been cutting back on the growth of
plant and equipment and retrenching and rationalizing the workforce and has also successfully pushed
the agenda for slashing social expenditures. All of which has contributed to a persistent weakness of
aggregate demand. This is the source of vulnerability of the economy.
The vulnerability is manifested in over-investment, declining capacity utilization, a squeeze of
manufacturing prices and declining profitability. The growth of finance temporary alleviated some of
the shortfall of demand – through a form of asset Keynesianism. However this underlying structural
weakness continued to plague the economy, fostering an increasing dependence on finance.

2.1.3. Over-Investment
An alternative thesis posited by Kotz (2009, 2011) also ascribes a central causal role to
developing overcapacity. However, it is not excessive competition but asset price bubbles that fosters
over-capacity. Such bubbles temporarily push demand above its normal level, spurring creation of
growing productive capacity – over investment. With debt deflation, demand returns to its normal
level, precipitating excess productive capacity. Over-investment results in too much fixed capital being
produced relative to demand in the economy as a whole. The housing bubble encouraged debt financed
consumer spending stimulating excessive investment in relation to normal level demands. The growing
gap between wages and profits, between increase in labor productivity and wage earnings of production
workers implies a more limited normal level of consumer demand. Stoked by the asset bubble and
rising indebtedness, household consumer demand rises above its normal relation to household income
and firms step up investment. Unsustainable expectations about future profit and demand led to
overinvestment. As the expectations fail to materialize with the collapse of the bubble, capacity
utilization rates fell, driving down the profit rate and finally the rate of investment was sharply cut
back. The crisis manifests itself in declining capacity utilization that exerts a downward pressure on the
rate of profit.

2.1.4. Profitability and Debt
Shaikh (2010) focuses on the underlying trends in profitability as the principal driver of
accumulation. In particular he focuses on the “rate of profit of enterprise”, the difference between the
general rate of profit (where profits are measured gross of interest payments) and the rate of interest as
the crucial variable that governs investment. The competitive impetus towards increasing
mechanization and labour substituting technical change engenders the underlying long term tendency
towards a fall in the profit rate. However, the concerted attack on labour launched in the eighties,

stemmed the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, as real wages stagnated through this period. Along
with the suppression of the growth of real wages there was a sharp fall in the interest rate. Together
these two trends acted to raise the rate of profit of enterprise and fuelled the neoliberal boom. This
boom, and the regime of low interest rates had the contradictory effect of stoking a surge of debt and
borrowing. The boom was halted when the fall in interest rates and the rise in degree of indebtedness
reached their limits. The favourable upward trend in the rate of profit of enterprise came to an end,
precipitating the crisis.
Moseley (2010) offers a similar explanation, according primacy of place to both profitability
and debt. Declining profitability, driven primarily by the rising cost of unproductive labour, in the
1960s pushed to economy towards a phase of prolonged stagnation. Two sets of factors were adopted
to counter declining profitability. First, wage suppression in the U.S., increasing exploitation of labour
in the form of “speed-up”, widespread bankruptcies and globalization as the worldwide search for
lower wages; and second, unprecedented levels of credit flows to both capitalist firms and workingclass households. Over time, this led to a historically high level of debt, a significant portion of which
is external debt, build-up relative to aggregate income flows. This debt overhang is a source of
continued fragility and stagnation for the U.S. economy.

2.1.5. Liquidity trap and Disproportionality
Michl (2010) also focuses on the role of profitability in driving investment. The puzzle of
sluggish growth of non-residential investment despite a favourable trend in profitability is explained by
greater uncertainty about prospective yields and weaker expectations about the future in the face of
rising external imbalances and import penetration of the US market by Chinese manufactures. The
erosion of investor confidence due to the relocation of global manufacturing and the rise of competing
centers of production around China propelled the descent into a liquidity trap. The recovery after the

2001 recession was largely concentrated on residential investment so that the current crisis, in this
account, appears to be a crisis of disproportionality rather than that of “over-investment”.

2.1.6. Crisis of financial hegemony
Dumenil and Levy (2010), and Mohun (2010) do not see the current crisis as the outcome of
falling profitability. Both focus on the growing disparity in the incomes of the managerial and
supervisory class in relation to the production worker and the popular classes (including commercial
and clerical employees) and increasing economic power of the former class. This class configuration
underlies what Dumenil and Levy characterize as the hegemony of finance (2004, 2010)4. The
unbridled quest for enrichment by the ruling classing coalition spurred the process of financialization
and globalization. In the process persistent macro-disequilibria were generated in the form of rising
indebtedness, growing global imbalances (boosted by a rising share of consumption in the US) and the
slowdown of accumulation. The growth of finance and speculation is explained not through the
exhaustion of investment opportunities and falling profitability but rather the changing class
configuration that favours short-term risk taking. The slowdown in investment is also the outcome of
the success of this ruling elite to capture a growing share of surplus.

2.2. State of the Debate
Thus the crisis has been characterized at one end as that of a structural inadequacy of aggregate
demand that might only be temporarily alleviated by asset price bubbles or stock market Keynesianism
(Bellamy Foster 2009; Brenner 2010; Kotz 2011). The inadequacy of demand is seen alternatively as a
reflection of growing monopoly (Bellamy Foster 2009), and of intensification of competition (Brenner
4
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2010). At the other end, Dumenil and Levy (2010) point to the declining personal savings rate and
growing external deficits of the US to suggest that the current conjuncture is marked by overconsumption. Again there is the argument that the crisis was preceded by an investment boom because
of a temporary boost to demand (Kotz 2011) on the one hand, and a temporary alleviation of the trend
of falling profitability (Shaikh 2010) on the other. In stark contrast to this is the argument of persistent
slowdown in investment (Dumenil and Levy 2010). Again, the crisis is seen as being characterized by
declining profitability (Brenner 2010, Kliman 2010) in some explanations and rising profitability
(Dumenil and Levy 2010, Mohun 2010) in other explanations. Even within the explanations based on
rising profitability, Mohun (2010), on the one hand, sees the crisis coming from the upswing in
profitability and speculative excess culminating in a financial crisis that makes its impact on the real
sector felt through the consequent evaporation of demand, while Dumenil and Levy (2010), on the
other, argue that the current crisis cannot be categorized either as demand or profitability crisis – hence
the alternative typology of a “crisis of financial hegemony”. Finally the rise of finance itself is
explained in some approaches as the outcome of the stagnation of the real economy (Bellamy- Foster
2009) and in others as a manifestation of increasing profitability, euphoric speculative excess, and the
rules of the neoliberal order that draws surplus from investment, towards distribution in the form of
capital incomes - interest and dividends (Dumenil and Levy 2010; Mohun 2010).
Not only is there intense debate on the structural causes of the crisis, there seems to be no
agreement even on the more easily resolvable issues of the underlying empirical trends. A survey of
literature is confronted by a daunting excess of conflicting characterizations5. As a first step towards
resolving the debate, it is necessary to clarify these underlying empirical trends. We might not come
closer to a consensus on explaining the crisis, but for constructive debate there has to be some
coherence to the account of the empirical contours of the crisis.

5
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The first question concerns the underlying trend of profitability. Was the rate of profit rising or
falling in the prelude to the crisis? There is broad agreement that profitability is central to capitalist
reproduction. However, even though there is broad agreement about the importance of profitability, the
precise measure of the rate of profit remains a contentious issue.
Estimates of the profit rate differ, for instance, on the treatment of direct profit taxes, i.e. taxes
on corporate income. Dumenil and Levy (2011) argue that profit taxes would also need to be deducted
for a more realistic yardstick of profit flows. The measure of “capital stock” could be valued at
historical values or replacement values. Replacement cost measures are favored as being more
reflective both of business practice (Shaikh 1999, Dumenil and Levy 2011) and Marx's own writings.6
The stock could be measured net or gross of the depreciation allowance. Net stock measures impart an
upward bias to profit rates since net stocks decline with the age of the machine (Shaikh 1999). Again,
demand factors which impart short run fluctuations to the profit rate could be removed from the
picture, by deflating the observed rate of profit with capacity utilization rate, to arrive at longer-term
trends of profitability (Shaikh 1999). The measure of choice could then drive the empirical outcome.
It is equally important to untangle the drivers of profitability, to decompose the rate of profit
into its underlying determinants. The trends in labor productivity, capital productivity, and profit share
are important in unraveling the role of technology and distribution in determining the trajectory of the
profit rate. Were shifts in income distribution important, or were technological factors salient, or were
demand factors more important? Even here, as we discuss in detail later, there are differences in how
the decomposition is implemented.

6

We believe Marx was quite unambiguously in favor of using replacement cost valuation of the capital stock. Discussing
the scenario where a new and less costly (in terms of labor hours required for its production) machinery has been inducted
into the production process, he notes: “As the value of the raw material may change, so too may that of the instruments of
labor, the machinery, etc. employed in the [production] process; and consequently that portion of the value of the product
transferred to it from them may also change. If, as a result of a new invention, machinery of a particular kind can be
produced with a lessened expenditure of labor, the old machinery undergoes a certain amount of depreciation, and therefore
transfers proportionately less value to the product.” (Marx, 1990, p. 318).

The second empirical question relates to demand. To what extent has consumption demand
been a constraint on investment? Can we empirically assess the prevalence of overinvestment in
relation to either demand or profitability? In the context of globalization the question becomes more
vexed as consumption could be growing buoyantly without a commensurate impact on domestic
investment, as a larger share of consumption demand is fulfilled by imports. Domestic investment
could stagnate even as domestic capital steps up foreign direct investment and off-shores production in
the search for lower wage locations in the periphery.
Clarity on these two major issues, the question of profitability and the question of aggregate
demand, would help answer the question of whether the rise of finance, one of the key characteristic
features of contemporary capitalism, reflects the stagnation of the real economy – either in the form of
low profitability or low demand – or a reconfiguration of class relations of advanced capitalism. While
issues surrounding the question of aggregate demand are important and deserve serious analyses, this
paper will attempt to address the first question. It will primarily focus on disentangling the profitability
issue in two steps. First, it will present profitability trends for the post-War U.S. economy for a wide
range of definitions. Second, it will try to analyze the trends in technology and distribution to throw
light on the drivers of profitability.

3. Profitability Trends
There is a broad consensus within the Marxist tradition, as we have already indicated, to see the
rate of profit as one of the crucial variables determining the decidedly turbulent dynamics of any
capitalist economy and crucially affecting its reproduction through time. As indicated by Marx in
Volume II of Capital and demonstrated rigorously within a formal mathematical model by Foley
(1982), the rate of expansion of a capitalist economy is limited by the general rate of profit that it can
generate. The intuition is straightforward. Expansion of a capitalist economy is the accumulation of

capital; accumulation, in its turn, rests on capitalizing surplus value, i.e., generating and realizing
surplus value. Since profit is a form of expression of surplus value, it follows that the rate of profit
governs the rate of expansion of the system. On the demand side it has an impact on the inducement to
investment; on the supply side, it determines the financing of investment. There is also in addition a
link between profitability and stability (Dumenil and Levy (1993)7.
The rate of profit is defined as the ratio of profit flows in a given time period to the capital
value tied-up (stock of capital) in production and circulation that supported the generation and
realization of the profit flow. Disagreement among Marxist political economists arises because there
are different ways to measure both profit flows and the stock of capital. Profit flows could be defined,
in the broadest sense, to include all income flows other than compensation of employees. Starting from
the broad measure, we could gradually remove depreciation, indirect taxes on production and imports,
direct taxes, interest payments, and dividend payments, to arrive at progressively narrower definitions
of profit flows.
The broadest measure of the “stock of capital” that underlies the profit flows should include
productive capital (undepreciated fixed assets, raw materials and inventories of unfinished
commodities), commodity capital (inventories of finished commodities awaiting sale) and financial
capital (money, including depreciation funds, and financial assets). Since it is difficult to come across
consistent time series data on all these forms in which stocks of value appear in a capitalist economy,
most researchers narrow down the measure of capital to fixed assets.8 Even with this narrow definition,
measures could vary across at least four dimensions. First, the stock of fixed assets could be measured
net of depreciation to give the net stock of fixed assets or could include depreciation to give the gross
7

Dumenil and Levy (1993) argue that the profit rate conditions the manner in which firms react to demand and supply
disequilibria. Low profitability exacerbates instability by prompting large quantity adjustments (rather than price
adjustments).
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In the Appendix, we include the value of inventories of the nonfarm sector to estimate a broader measure of capital stock.
The profitability trends and decomposition analysis do not change when this broader measure if used; for details, see the
Appendix.

stock of fixed assets. Second, the stock could be valued at historical costs (i.e., at prices paid when they
were originally installed and inducted into the production and circulation process) or they could be
valued at replacement cost (i.e., at the current market value that would be sufficient to replace the stock
of fixed assets). Third, the stock of assets could be valued net of liabilities to give us the net worth.
Fourth, since a given stock of capital can be utilized at or below capacity depending on conditions of
demand, deflating by the capacity utilization rate could be used to arrive at the “normal capacity”
measure of the capital stock.
Instead of taking a stand right away on the “correct” measure of the rate of profit, this section
summarizes trends in all the measures of the profit rate. This evidence regarding profitability trends in
the post War U.S. Economy is meant to offer a chance to readers to see for themselves how the
different measures evolve over time and, if possible, to push researchers to come to an agreement about
a common measure to use. We use annual data, and in defining the (various measures of the) rate of
profit terms we follow the following timing convention: the profit rate for a given year has been
computed by dividing the profit income for a particular year by the estimate of the stock of fixed assets
at the end of the previous year. This timing convention is meant to capture the idea that the stock of
fixed assets at the beginning of a year (or end of the previous year) “earned” the profit income for that
year.
In this section, we present profitability trends for the U.S. economy using data from two
different sources: (1) National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), and Fixed Asset data of the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), and (2) Flow of Funds (FOF) data from the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors. The NIPA data, in turn, is presented for two different large sectors of the U.S.
Economy: (a) the Corporate Business (CB) sector, and (b) the Nonfinancial Corporate Business
(NFCB) sector. The FOF data is presented for the Nonfarm Nonfinancial Corporate Business (NNFCB)
sector.
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FIGURE 1: Rate of Profit, U.S. Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2010 (Capital Stock:
Replacement Cost Net Total Fixed Assets)
45

Net Value Added less
Compensation of
Employees

40
35

Net Operating Surplus

percentage

30
25

Net Operating Surplus
less Interest Payments

20
15

Before-tax Profits (with
IVA and CCAdj)

10
5
0
1940

After-tax Profits (with
IVA and CCAdj)
1960

1980

2000

2020

FIGURE 2: Rate of Profit, U.S. Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2010 (Capital Stock: Historical
Cost Net Total Fixed Assets)
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FIGURE 4: Rate of Profit, U.S. Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2010 (Capital Stock: Historical
Cost Gross Total Fixed Assets)

3.1. BEA Data: NIPA and Fixed Asset Tables
3.1.1. Corporate Business (CB) Sector
Figure 1 and 2 plot the annual rate of profit for the U.S. corporate business sector computed
from NIPA data using replacement cost and historical cost values, respectively, for the net stock of total
fixed asset. The data for various measures of the flow of profit come from NIPA Table 1.14 and run up
to 2010, and the data for the stock of total fixed assets come from NIPA Table 6.1 through 6.4, with the
latter giving year-end estimates of the stock. The profit rate for a given year, as already noted, has been
computed by dividing the profit income for a particular year by the estimate of the stock of fixed assets
at the end of the previous year.
The broadest measure of profit flows, in Figures 1 and 2, is net value added less compensation
of employees including inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments. Starting from this
broad measure we arrive at narrower measures of profit flows by removing different categories of
income flows. Our broad measure less production and import taxes gives net operating surplus. When
we further remove net interest payments and net business transfer payments we get before-tax profits;
when we remove taxes on corporate income from this, we arrive at after-tax profits9.
Figure 3 and 4 summarize profitability trends that are similar to those summarized in Figures 1
and 2. The only difference is that, in Figures 3 and 4, gross capital stock measures are used instead of
net capital stock measures.10 The profit flow measures are exactly the same, with one addition, gross
operating surplus, which is defined as the sum of net operating surplus and depreciation.

9

The further deduction of dividend distribution would yield the narrowest measure corresponding to retained earnings of
the enterprises or the internally generated funds available for investment.
10
With the 1995 comprehensive revision of the NIPAs, the BEA started using geometric as opposed to straight-line
depreciation. With geometric depreciation, gross stocks cannot be computed accurately because some assets in each vintage
of the stock have infinite service lives. Hence, our estimates of the gross capital stock used in this paper are only
approximations. For more details see U.S. Department of Commerce (2003). We would like to thanks Thomas R Michl for
pointing this out.

3.1.2. Nonfinancial Corporate Business (NFCB) Sector
Within a Marxian framework of analysis, financial sector incomes (and profits) are a transfer of
surplus value generated in the non-financial sectors of the economy. Hence, we next look at
profitability trends solely in the nonfinancial corporate business sector.
Figure 5 is the analog of Figure 1. It plots the rate of profit for the NFCB sector using
replacement cost valuation of the net total fixed asset (capital stock). Figure 6 corresponds to Figure 2;
it plots the rate of profit for the NFCB sector using historical cost valuation of the capital stock. Figures
7 and 8 are the analogs of Figures 3 and 4 in that they plot the various measures of the rate of for the
NFCB sector using gross total fixed assets as the measure of capital stock.

3.1.3. Summary of Profit Rate Trends: NIPA data
When replacement cost valuation of the capital stock is used, evolution of the rate of profit in
both the CB and NFCB sector (Figures 1, 3, 5 and 7) indicate two major periods; this periodization,
moreover, is independent of the measure of profit that is used (before or after tax, with or without IVA
& CCAdj, including or excluding interest payments). The first, running from the late 1940s to the early
1980s, was a period of declining profitability (with fluctuations at business cycle frequencies imposed
on top of this declining trend). This period ended in the early 1980s; the declining trend was reversed
and we enter into the second period, which saw an upward trend in profitability (with large fluctuations
coinciding with the downturns in the late 1990s and the Great Recession). The current crisis was not
preceded by a long period of declining profitability as was in evidence during the structural crisis of the
late 1970s; the fall in the rate of profit during the current crisis coincides with a short run downward
movement associated with fluctuations of the rate of profit at business cycle frequencies.
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FIGURE 6: Rate of Profit, U.S. Nonfinancial Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2010 (Capital
Stock: Historical Cost Net Total Fixed Assets)
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FIGURE 8: Rate of Profit, U.S. Nonfinancial Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2010 (Capital
Stock: Replacement Cost Net Total Fixed Assets)

When historical cost valuation of the capital stock is used (Figures 2, 4, 6 and 8), we see two
interesting patterns. First, broader measures of the rate of profit (using the net or gross operating
surplus, for instance) display a trend of secular decline over the whole post War period for both the CB
and the NFCB sectors. Second, narrower measures of the rate of profit (using after-tax, after-interest
rate of profit, for instance) display a different pattern: a period of decline that runs up to the early 1980s
is followed by a trend-less period after that.
The conclusion from the analysis of NIPA data seems to be that there is a break in the declining
trend of profitability in the early 1980s; this emerges for all measures of profit flows when replacement
cost valuation is used for the capital stock, and it also emerges for narrower measures of profit flow
when historical cost valuation is used. The only measures that fail to display this break in trend in the
early 1980s, are those using historical cost valuation (of the stock of capital) and the broad measures of
profit flows.11

3.2. Flow of Funds
Using data from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve, we compute various
measures of the rate of profit for the U.S. Nonfarm Nonfinancial Corporate Business (NNFCB) sector.
The FOF data is useful for two reasons. First, it allows us to analyze trends in the NNFCB sector,
which is not possible on the basis of NIPA data. Second, it allows us to use net worth as a measure of
tied-up capital, which, again, is not possible with NIPA data. We use two different measures of the
tied-up capital: the total nonfinancial assets, and net worth.
Figures 9 and 10 plot the rate of profit for the U.S. Nonfarm Nonfinancial Corporate Business
11

Historical cost valuation basically “rotates” the profit rate time series by raising the early observations and lowering the
later ones. This is because historical cost valuation of the capital stock amounts to ignoring inflation in the price of fixed
assets. Since the rate of profit is the ratio of the profit flow and the stock of capital, ignoring the inflation in the price of the
term appearing in the denominator “rotates” the whole series. We would like to thank Duncan Foley for this insight.

(NNFCB) sector computed from flow of funds data from the Federal Reserve, the first using the stock
of nonfinancial assets valued at replacement cost and the second the stock of nonfinancial assets
valued at historical cost. The shaded region at the end indicates the Great Recession beginning in 2008.
Figures 11 and 12 are the analogs of Figures 9 and 10. They plot the rate of profit for the U.S.
Nonfarm Nonfinancial Corporate Business (NNFCB) sector computed from flow of funds data from
the Federal Reserve suing the net worth valued at replacement cost and historical cost, respectively.

3.2.1. Summary of Profit Rate Trends: Flow of Funds data
Nonfinancial Assets: Figure 9 and 10, computed from Flow of Funds data and using the yearend estimates of nonfinancial assets to measure capital stock arrive at pretty much the same trend as
Figures 1, 3, 5 and 7.
In terms of trend, both sets of plots highlight the two major periods referred to earlier,
irrespective of what measure of profit income is used (before or after tax, with or without IVA &
CCAdj, including or excluding interest payments) and how the capital stock is valued (replacement
cost or historical cost, gross or net). The first period of declining profitability ends in the early 1980s,
and is followed by (1) a period with rising trend (with large fluctuations coinciding with the downturns
in the late 1990s and the Great Recession) if replacement costs valuation is used for the nonfinancial
assets, and (2) a more or less trendless period if historical cost valuation is used.
In terms of levels, there is an interesting difference. With historical cost valuation of assets, the
level of after-tax and after-interest rate of profit since the 1980s is generally lower than that observed in
the 1950s; with replacement cost valuation, the levels are closer together. The before-tax before-interest
rate of profit (including IVA and CCAdj) attains similar levels in both periods, irrespective of asset
valuation method.

Hence, from Figures 9 and 10, we can assert that the current crisis was not preceded by a long
period of declining profitability as was in evidence during the structural crisis of the late 1970s.

Net Worth: Figure 11 and 12 plot the rate of profit using the net worth instead of the stock of
nonfinancial assets. With replacement cost valuation (Figure 11), we get the same trends as before.
With historical cost valuation (Figure 12), we get a slightly different picture: the before-interest beforetax rate of profit shows a declining trend since the late 1970s, but the after-tax rate of profit is pretty
much flat (with large fluctuations in the downturns of the late 1990s and the Great Recession).

4. Technology and Distribution: Drivers of Profitability
4.1. Decomposing the Profit Rate
What are the drivers of profitability trends that have been summarized in Figures 1 through 12?
To address this question, we will decompose the rate of profit into two components, one capturing the
class distribution of income and the other capturing technological factors as: rate of profit =
(profit/output) * (output/capital stock), i.e., the rate of profit is decomposed as the product of the profit
share and the output-capital ratio (also known as capital productivity). Of course, this is not the only
way to decompose the rate of profit. Starting with Weisskopf (1979), many researchers have also
included the capacity utilization to capture the short run fluctuations in the rate of profit due to
fluctuations of aggregate demand as follows: rate of profit = (profit/output) * (output/capacity output) *
(capacity output/capital stock). Here, the rate of profit is decomposed as the product of the profit share,
capacity utilization and the capacity-capital ratio.
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(Capital Stock: Historical Cost Nonfinancial Assets)
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(Capital Stock: Replacement Cost Net Worth)
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(Capital Stock: Replacement Cost Net Worth)

Following Michl (1988) and Foley and Michl (1999), we will use the former decomposition,
instead of the latter. The advantage of using this decomposition – rate of profit = profit share * capital
productivity – is that we can avoid estimating an unobservable quantity like “capacity output”, without
which the capacity utilization rate cannot be defined. In effect this decomposition allows fluctuations in
aggregate demand to impact on both profit shares and capital productivity instead of concentrating on
its effect on the capacity utilization rate. This is more realistic because aggregate demand fluctuations
can impact not only aggregate output (in comparison to “capacity” output) but also income distribution
and technological factors.
For the decomposition analysis, we will use NIPA data because that gives us the direct data on
the commonly used measure of “broad” profit flows, the net operating surplus. The share of profit is,
then, computed as the ratio of (a) net operating surplus (net value added less employee compensation
less production & import taxes) with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments, and (b)
the net value added; the output-capital ratio (or capital productivity) is computed as the ratio of (a) the
net value added, and (b) net stock of total fixed assets.

4.1.1. Replacement Cost Capital Stock
Figures 13 and 15 display the decomposition of the profit rate into its technology and
distribution components for the CB and NFCB sector respectively, where the replacement cost
valuation of the capital stock has been used. What trends in income distribution and technology emerge
from the data? Both Figures 13 and 15 (which use replacement cost capital stock) display very
interesting trends regarding technology and income distribution.
Let us first take up technology. Figure 13 and 15 show that there were four different periods of
technological evolution in post-War U.S. The first period, running up to 1968, witnessed improving
capital productivity, with a burst of capital-saving technological change over the decade 1958-68. With

1968 (for CB) and 1966 (for NFCB) marking the apogee of capital productivity in post-War U.S., we
enter the second period of declining capital productivity, which continues for the next decade and a half
till 1982. For NFCB, capital productivity declines from 0.799 in 1966 to 0.543 in 1982, a massive 32
percent fall in a decade and a half; for the CB sector, the output capital ratio declines from 0.800 in
1968 to 0.555 in 1982, a similar 31 percent decline. The declining trend is reversed in 1982, which
marks the beginning of the third period of technology, a period of slowly rising capital productivity.
The third period runs from 1982 to 2000, with capital productivity rising by 25 percent for CB and 28
percent for the NFCB sector over the whole period (with a significant acceleration during the 1990s)
but attaining a peak that is significantly lower than its peak in 1968. There is a very significant trendreversal in 2000, which takes us into the fourth period of declining capital productivity. Since 2000,
capital productivity has trended downward and the magnitude of decline (between 2000 and 2009) has
been a massive 27 percent for the CB sector and 28 percent for the NFCB sector.12 Thus, the previous
period's gain has been completely wiped out, with the value of the output-capital ratio now at its lowest
in the whole post-War period.
Let us now turn to income distribution between the two fundamental social classes in
capitalism. This displays interesting, but less complicated, trends. Figures 13 and 15 show that the
whole postwar period can be divided into two broad periods in terms of the evolution of income
distribution between capitalists and workers. The first period runs till the early 1980s and witnessed a
significant decline in the share of income accruing to the capitalist class, with most of that decline
taking place after the late 1960s. Between 1948 and 1980, the share of profit income in the NFCB
sector declined from 22.27 percent to 14.46 percent of total corporate income, a massive drop by all
accounts; for the CB sector, the corresponding decline was from 22.52 percent in 1948 to 15.81 percent
in 1980. The trend of declining profit share was reversed in 1982, which begins the second period
12

The decline in capital productivity since 2000 is a little exaggerated because the years since 2007 have witnessed low
capacity utilization. But if we instead look at the peak-to-peak period 1997-2007, we see a similar, though smaller, decline
in the output-capital ratio of 12 and 13 percent for the CB and NFCB sectors respectively.

marked by rising profit shares much more so for the whole CB than the NFCB sector (giving evidence
of the rising share of profits accruing to the financial sector). The second period of rising (or flat) profit
share also shows major fluctuations. The rising trend that continues almost unbroken from 1982 is
reversed for brief periods significantly by the two recessions. Both the 2001 and the 2008 recessions
display a period of rapid decline in profit share starting about 2-3 years before the start of the recession;
but the decline over the 2001 downturn is quickly reversed, and even surpassed, during the ensuing
recovery.
Bringing together trends in the evolution of technology and income distribution, we can now
offer an explanation of profitability trends in the U.S. over the post War period and a hypothesis for the
structural crisis that many have identified as having begun in 2008. The decades immediately following
the second World War saw stable (or rising) profits because profit shares were stable and capital
productivity was rising. The period since the mid-1960s saw a significant deterioration of the
technological underpinnings of U.S. capitalism with capital productivity falling. With profit shares
falling as well, this meant declining profitability, which resulted in the first structural crisis of post-war
capitalism in the late 1970s. The neoliberal counter-revolution restored the income share of the
capitalist class, especially of those related to the financial sector. The information technology
revolution gave an impetus for capital-saving technological change so that capital productivity started
increasing once again. These extremely favorable trends in both distribution and technology helped a
revival of the profit rate. Dumenil and Levy (2010) and Mohun (2010) have highlighted these favorable
developments.
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However, the favorable technological impetus worked itself out by the late 1990s. Faced with
falling capital productivity, profitability was shored up by a further shift in income distribution towards
the capitalist class, helped no doubt by financialization and the growth of working class debt
(Lapavitsas, 2010). When the share of profit income collapsed, preceding the downturn of 2007, this
reinforced adverse technological trends to precipitate another structural crisis of capitalism. The buildup of working-class debt, which had helped fuel the housing price boom and also effected a regressive
income redistribution, ushered in a long period of deleveraging when the Great Recession struck,
prolonging a downturn into the severest crisis since the Great Depression.

4.1.2. Historical Cost Valuation of Capital Stock
Figure 14 and 16 present the decomposition results for historical cost capital stock data. The
results are pretty similar to those for replacement cost capital stock. The main difference is that, with
historical cost capital stock, the decline in capital productivity starts in the late 1970s and continues
right into the current period. If historical cost valuation is used, it is difficult to locate the structural
crisis of global capitalism in the late 1970s.

4.2. Patterns of Technological Change
The decomposition of profit rate decomposition helps identify the technological and
distributional underpinnings of the current crisis. Marx‟s discussion of technological change,
accumulation and profitability gives a primacy to technology in driving profitability. Capitalist
competition compels a process of technical change that deploys increasing capital intensity and
mechanization as a means of extracting a larger surplus from labor. This pattern of labor-saving
technological change is critical to Marx‟s formulation of the law of tendency of the falling rate of

profit. The insights from the profit decomposition exercise could be sharpened with an analysis of the
specific patterns of technological change over the decades.
To explore patterns of technological change, Figure 17 plots capital productivity and two
measures of labor productivity (output per person and output per hour) for the U.S. nonfinancial
corporate business sector for the period 1958-2010. With labor and capital productivity juxtaposed, it is
immediately clear that the NFCB sector has witnessed three distinct periods of technological evolution
since 1968. The first period, running from 1966 to 1982, witnessed what Foley and Michl (1999) have
termed Marx-biased technological change: growing labor productivity and falling capital productivity.
Essentially productivity of labor is increased, during such periods, through increasing capital intensity.
This is the period which saw the collapse of the capital labor accord that had buttressed the golden age
as profit rates declined. The decline in profitability is however related to unfavorable (Marx-biased)
technical change rather than to any decrease in labor productivity.
Restoring profitability depended in the first instance on squeezing workers to ensure a rising
profit share – reversing the erosion in preceding period. However, the second period, stretching from
1982 to 2000, also saw a different pattern of technological evolution when both labor and capital
productivity increased. This pattern of technological change, which is favorable to profitability, does
not conform to the classic pattern of Marx-biased technical change. The twin trends of rising capital
productivity and rising profit share propelled the recovery of profitability in this period.
The third period begins in 2000 and is currently still running its course. In this third period, the
U.S. NFCB sector is back to a regime of Marx-biased technological change: labor productivity has
continued to grow, along with the profit share, but capital productivity has declined to its lowest in the
post- war period. This period poses potential profitability problems for capitalism. In the current period
since 2000, profitability has so far (for about a decade) been propped up by the regressive redistribution
of income away from the working class while ruling class coalition, aided by the housing bubble and

financialization, pursued successful campaign of enrichment. While there does not appear to be any
sign that this quest for enrichment is being curbed in the wake of the financial meltdown, there would
be a limit to the extent to which profit shares can continue to be increased. At the same time the
persistent decline in capital productivity is exerting an inexorable downward pull on profitability. The
sharp decline in capital productivity is a significant factor shaping the current crisis.
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4. 3 Behind Declining Capital Productivity
What lies behind the evolution of capital productivity over the past few decades? What is
driving its sharp decline since 2000? We will approach such questions through two routes. First, we
will look at capital productivity from the perspective of capital intensity; second, we will approach

capital productivity through relative rates of technological progress in the capital goods sector.

4.3.1. Labor Productivity and Capital Intensity
Capital productivity is, by definition, the ratio of the labor productivity (Y/L) and the capital
intensity (K/L). Hence, the growth rate of capital productivity is the difference between the growth rate
of labor productivity and capital intensity. Figure 18 summarizes the growth rates of capital
productivity and its two components for the three different periods of technological evolution that we
have identified for the postwar U.S. economy: 1966-1982, 1982-2000 and 2000-2010.
In the first period between 1966 and 1982, which was the prelude to the first post-War structural
crisis of the early 1980s, capital productivity fell by 2.38 percent per annum; during the same period,
labor productivity (output per person) increased by 0.78 percent per annum and capital intensity
increased by 3.16 per cent per annum. During the recovery between 1982 and 2000, capital
productivity grew at an annual compound rate of 1.39 percent per annum; however in the run-up to the
current structural crisis between 2000 and 2010, it fell at the rate of 2.43 percent per annum. Between
1982 and 2000, labor productivity grew at an annual compound rate of 2.11 percent per annum;
between 2000 and 2010, it grew at 2.03 percent per annum. Thus, labor productivity grew more rapidly
after 1982, and at roughly the same rate during these two later periods, but capital productivity
displayed sharply divergent trends.
The difference in the evolution of capital productivity during the recovery from the last
structural crisis and the prelude to the current crisis (the second and third period) reflects the different
evolutions of capital intensity in these two periods. Between 1982 and 2000, capital intensity grew very
slowly at about 0.73 percent per annum, suggesting that the increase in labor productivity in this period
was not driven by Marx–biased technical change. Between 2000 and 2010, on the other hand, capital
intensity grew six times faster at 4.46 percent per annum. Comparing with the first period, it seems that

both the technologically positive period during 1982 to 2000 and the technologically regressive period
since 2000 has been driven by the unusual growth of capital intensity.
During the former period, a very slow growth of capital intensity allowed for a relatively rapid
growth of labor productivity, This pattern ran its course by 2000, after which only a very high growth
of capital intensity has managed to keep labor productivity growing at a similar rate. The question,
therefore, really boils down to explaining this transformation in the pattern of technological change
evidenced in the different pace of growth of capital intensity in the two periods.
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Assets)
Marx‟s discussion of mechanization and capital-intensive technical change viewed the
trend as an outcome of a rapid growth of accumulation. It was capitalism‟s dynamic drive to
accumulate and innovate that led to the potential erosion of profitability. The current period is

paradoxical in that it is also period when capital accumulation has slowed down even as capital
intensity has risen sharply13.

4.3.1. Real Capital Productivity and the Relative Price of Capital
The other way to approach this question is, following Michl (1988), to decompose capital
productivity into the ratio of (a) real capital productivity (ratio of real net value added and real capital
stock) and (b) the relative price of capital (ratio of implicit price deflator for capital stock and the GDP
deflator). Note that a rising trend in real capital productivity, and a falling trend in the relative price of
capital can increase the rate of profit, and therefore corresponds to what Marx termed the
countervailing tendencies to the tendency for the rate of profit to decline with capitalist development.
The real output-capital ratio captures the effect of technological change that is independent of relative
price changes. It shows, in real terms, the output per unit of labor-power (labor productivity) that is
engendered by mechanization (capital per unit of labor-power). The relative price of capital (ratio of
implicit price deflator for capital stock and the GDP deflator) is what Marx had called the “cheapening
of the elements of capital”. When it falls, it gives indication of relatively rapid technological change in
the capital goods sector in contrast to the whole economy.
Figure 19 and 20 plot the nominal & real capital productivity and the relative price of capital for
the period 1946-2010 for the Nonfinancial Corporate Business Sector; the former uses the net stock of
total fixed assets and the latter uses the net stock of nonresidential fixed assets as measures of the
capital stock. Both display similar trends; hence, the results are not driven by the pronounced boom in
residential asset prices in the 2000s.
Figures 19 and 20 show that since the early 1980s, the real output-capital ratio has been more or

13

The rate of accumulation (non-residential investment as a share of fixed nonresidential assets) has fallen from a peak of
about 4.5% in 1999/2000 to about 0.5% in 2009 (Kotz 2011).

less stable, hovering around a value of 0.6, so that movements in the nominal output-capital ratio has
been driven completely by movements in the relative price of capital. After rising significantly between
1966 and 1982, the relative price of capital saw a steady decline for a decade with the declining trend
broken in 1993. Between 1993 and 2004, the relative price of capital remained stable at around a value
of 0.91 and started increasing again since 2004. Shaikh (1998) has pointed to a systematic upward bias
in durable and capital good price indexes due to inadequate adjustment for quality changes. Hence, we
should interpret the relative price trends cautiously, but the decline in capital productivity in the run up
to the current crisis would reflect the relatively slower pace of technological progress in the capital
goods industry.
4.3.2. Capital Productivity and the Crisis,
The preceding analysis suggests that the sharp fall in capital productivity since 2000 after a
period of fairly steady rise for nearly a two decade period, reflected the basic structural weakness of the
US economy as it plunged into crisis. In this paper, we have attempted to unravel what lay behind the
evolution of capital productivity.
The pervasive adoption and growth of information technology would have almost certainly
played an important role in shaping the particular evolution in the nineties when capital productivity
showed an upward trend. New forms of managerial control and organization, including just-in-time and
lean production systems have been deployed to enforce increases in labor productivity since the 1980‟s.
The phenomena of „speed-up‟ and stretching of work has enabled the extraction of larger productivity
gains per worker hour as evidenced the faster growth of labor productivity after 1982. People have
been working harder and faster. Information technology has facilitated the process. It enables greater
surveillance and control of the worker, and also rationalization of production to “computerize” and
automate certain tasks.
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Moreover, these productivity gains would have been possible with smaller increases in
investment since this technology does not necessarily require increasing capital intensity on a
commensurate scale. Information technology has also been realizing rapid gains in cost reductions so
that IT infrastructure is becoming less costly to adopt. Further, a large part of the initial R&D cost was
borne and subsidized by the State, further lowering the cost of capital investment. Thus labor
productivity was increased without necessitating increasing capital intensity.
The favorable trend in capital productivity is also fostered by globalization and off-shoring of
production. This allows a further cheapening of capital and intermediate inputs with some of the more
labor intensive and lower productivity (low value added) sectors being outsourced. This would also be
reflected in declining and stable relative prices of capital till 2004, which ameliorated the effect of
slower technological change in the capital goods sector through cheap imports (aided by the weak
dollar) and the retention of the higher productivity – high technology sectors within the US. After 2000
as larger sections of the production process got relocated globally, this advantage was exhausted. In the
1990‟s US multinationals added 4.4 million jobs in the US and 2.7 million jobs overseas – that is for
every one outsourced job about two jobs were being created in the US (Wessel 2011). The pattern
changed drastically in the 2000‟s. 2.9 million jobs were axed in the US even as 2.4 million jobs were
added abroad. It is clear that the process of off-shoring was accelerated in the past decade. The global
relocation of production would also be an important factor underlying the twin phenomena of declining
rates of accumulation and increasing capital intensity in the US.

5. Conclusion
There are two broad strands in the Marxist theorization of crisis: those focusing on demand
problems and those focusing on profitability. In the context of a lack of consensus on both the
appropriate measure of the profit rate and the characterization of its role and trend in the prelude to the

crisis, this paper is concerned with an empirical investigation of the profit rate that would help clarify
the theoretical debates. The main conclusion that we can derive from inspecting the time series plots of
various measures of the rate of profit for the U.S. economy (Figure 1 through 12) is that, other than one
case, all the measures display similar trends: there is a break in the declining trend of profitability in the
early 1980s; the subsequent period is marked by either a trend-less or a slowly rising trend in
profitability. The only exception is a measure of the rate of profit which uses historical cost valuation
for the capital stock and before-tax (both direct and indirect taxes), before-interest profit flow; this
measure displays a secularly declining trend for the whole postwar period.
The weight of evidence thus suggests clearly that the current crisis was not preceded by a
prolonged period of declining profitability. In fact, the current crisis was preceded by a period of rising
profitability, buoyed by favorable trends in both profit share and technology. Capital productivity
increased through the nineties along with rising labor productivity and declining capital intensity. The
tentative hypothesis provided here is that these favorable trends can be explained as the outcome of the
specificities of the information technology, globalization and the global relocation of production, and
the intensification of managerial control to enforce a steep increase of labor productivity.
Dumenil and Levy (2010) and Mohun 2010 have highlighted the favorable movements in
profitability to argue that the current crisis cannot be viewed as a crisis of profitability. They have
pointed to the similarities with the favorable pattern of capital productivity and profitability before the
Great Depression. We present the profit rate decomposition using the Dumenil-Levy data set (Dumenil
and Levy 2010b) in Figure 21, in order to make a broad comparison. The noteworthy feature about the
Great Depression (that emerges in Figure 21) is the sharp drop in capital productivity after 1929; this
breaks the longer term upward trend of capital productivity between 1910 and 1950. Once again the
factors that held the pattern of Marx biased technical change - with increasing capital intensity – in
check and fostered favorable trends in capital productivity – failed to prevent the precipitous fall in

capital productivity. The postwar recovery enabled the resumption of these favorable trends with the
capital-labor accord and the post New Deal state apparatus.
We believe there is reason to be a little cautious about this conclusion. The critical factor that
emerges from the decomposition analysis is the sharp decline in capital productivity prior to the crisis,
providing indication of deeper technological problems. There also seems to be a difference between the
current crisis and the Great Depression. The current crisis began in 2008 and was preceded by an 8 year
period of declining capital productivity. The Great Depression, which began in 1929 was not preceded
by declining capital productivity. In fact, it was preceded by a period of rising capital productivity (as
Figure 21 indicates) –what Dumenil and Levy have termed “The Great Leap Forward”. It seems,
therefore, that while the Great Depression cannot be characterized as a profitability crisis (because both
capital productivity and profit shares were favorable to capital), the current crisis requires a more
nuanced characterization (because capital productivity was declining, and profitability has been
propped up by regressive redistribution of income).
Of course, once the crisis hits, there is a precipitous fall in aggregate demand leading to a fall in
capacity utilization; this reduces the rate of profit during the crisis as is seen both during the Great
Depression and the current crisis. What is important, therefore, is to look at the period preceding the
crisis. In that respect, the current crisis seems to be different from the Great Depression.
Declining profitability might not have caused the Great Recession, but it certainly is an
intimation of an impending profitability problem. Profitability still matters. The attack on public sector
unions and the continual push for corporate tax breaks signal a drive to further shore up the profit
share. It is difficult to see the process going much further without exacerbating social tensions. The
slowdown in accumulation and the fall in capital productivity however portend a fragile recovery. What
complicates matters further is the class configuration underlying neoliberalism that has allowed the
siphoning of surplus towards the enrichment and consumption of the rich. This configuration is

depressing capital accumulation in the US, using the fears of a growing budget deficit to rein in fiscal
stimulus or redistributive spending programs and possibly stifling technological innovation and R&D
spending too (Lazonick & O'Sullivan, 2000; Dumenil & Levy, 2010). Without a deeper structural
transformation of this configuration there would be little scope for a sustained recovery of
accumulation.
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APPENDIX
1. Data Sources
1.1. BEA DATA: NIPA and FIXED ASSET TABLES
All data that has been used occur at an annual frequency. The following variables have been
used:
Gross value added, profits, taxes and other flow variables are taken from NIPA Table 1.14 for both CB
and NFCB sectors: 1929-2010. Data downloaded on June 22, 2011.
Replacement cost net capital stock (total fixed asset) data is from BEA Fixed Asset Table 6.1, and
replacement cost depreciation data is from NIPA Table 6.4; these are year-end estimates: 1929-2010.
Gross capital stock is computed as net capital stock plus depreciation. Data downloaded on June 29,
2011.
Historical cost net capital stock (total fixed asset) data is from BEA Fixed Asset Table 6.3, and
historical cost depreciation data is from NIPA Table 6.6; these are year-end estimates: 1929-2010.
Gross capital stock is computed as net capital stock plus depreciation. Data downloaded on June 29,
2011.
Data on the labour productivity index (output per hour and output per person) is from the Bureau of
Labour Statistics: 1958-2010. Data downloaded from FRB St. Louis on June 23, 2011.
Data on the GDP deflator is from NIPA Table 1.1.4. Data was downloaded on July 03, 2011.
The relative price of fixed capital is computed as the ratio of (a) an implicit price deflator for the fixed
capital stock, and (b) the GDP deflator. The implicit price deflator for the net stock of private fixed
assets is computed in two steps using the formulae in the NIPA Guide (2005). In the first step the
chained dollar value of the stock of fixed assets is computed as: chained dollar value = (chain-type
quantity index * current dollar value in 2005)/100, where data for the chain-type quantity index of
fixed assets is available from BEA Fixed Assets Table 6.2, the base year is 2005 and the current dollar
value of the fixed asset stock is taken from BEA Fixed Assets Table 6.1. In the second step the implicit
price deflator is computed as: implicit price deflator = (current dollar value * 100)/ chained dollar
value.

1.2. FLOW OF FUNDS DATA
All data are for the Nonfarm Nonfinancial Corporate Business sector and have been downloaded
on June 17, 2011. We use the following variables at an annual frequency for our analysis:
nonfinancial assets: series FL102010005.A
nonfinancial assets at historical cost: series FL102010115.A
net worth: series FL102090005.A

net worth at historical cost: series FL102090115.A
corporate profits before tax excluding IVA and CCAdj: series FA106060005.A
taxes on corporate income: series FA106231005.A
taxes on production and imports less subsidies, payable with corporate farms: series FA106240181.A
capital consumption allowance: series FA106300015.A
inventory valuation adjustment: series FA105020601.A

2. Profitability using Broader Measures of Capital Stock
In the text of the paper we have used various measures of fixed assets (or net worth) as an
estimate of the capital stock that supports the extraction and realization of surplus value. In a more
complete analysis of the process of capitalist reproduction, for instance the one presented by Marx in
Volume II of Capital and formalized in Foley (1982) and Basu (2011), one needs to clarify that what we
have denoted as capital stock really refers to stocks of value that attain three different forms in a typical
capitalist economy: productive capital (un-depreciated fixed assets, raw materials, inventory of
unfinished products), commercial capital (inventory of finished commodities awaiting sale) and
financial capital (money and other financial assets held by firms).
While it is difficult to get data on every component of the three forms of capital, there is
relatively reliable data on inventories of finished goods for the nonfarm sector in the US economy. In
this section of the Appendix, we add the value of nonfarm inventories to the various measures of
replacement value fixed assets to arrive at a broader measure of capital stock and carry out the profit
rate decomposition with this broader measure. The results are presented in Figure A1-A4. The
conclusion that we draw from these figures is that the inclusion of inventories do not change the
profitability, distribution or technology trends in any way. Hence, the results presented in the text of the
paper are valid even for the broader measure of capital stock which includes inventories.
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Figure A1: Rate of Profit, US Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2010 (Capital Stock: Replacement
Value Net Nonresidential Fixed Assets and nonfarm inventories)
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Figure A2: Rate of Profit, US Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2010 (Capital Stock: Replacement
Value Net Total Fixed Assets and nonfarm inventories)
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Figure A3: Rate of Profit, US Nonfinancial Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2010 (Capital Stock:
Replacement Value Net Nonresidential Fixed Assets and nonfarm inventories)
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Figure A4: Rate of Profit, US Nonfinancial Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2010 (Capital Stock:
Replacement Value Net Total Fixed Assets and nonfarm inventories)

